Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Mihir  Bhattacharya
Author-Name-First: Mihir 
Author-Name-Last: Bhattacharya
Author-Email: mihir.bhattacharya@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Author-Name: Ojasvi  Khare
Author-Name-First: Ojasvi 
Author-Name-Last: Khare
Author-Email: ojasvi19r@isid.ac.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute
Title: Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
Abstract: We consider a social choice model where voters have single-peaked preferences over the alternatives that are aggregated to produce contiguous sets or intervals of fixed cardinality, L. This is applicable in situations where the alternatives can be arranged in a line (e.g. plots of land) and a contiguous subset of these is required (e.g. a hospital or a school). We define interval-social choice correspondences (I-SCCs) on profiles of single-peaked preferences which select intervals. We extend single-peaked preferences to intervals using responsiveness.  We show that generalized median-interval (GMI) rules are the only strategy-proof, anonymous and interval efficient I-SCCs. These rules are interval versions of generalized median voter rules which consist of the median, min and max rules. We show that responsiveness over intervals is necessary for the strategy-proofness of the GMI rule if preferences over alternatives are single-peaked.
length: 21
Creation-Date: 20230314
Revision-Date: 20230809
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper89_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 89
Keywords: median voter
Keywords: responsive
Keywords: single-peaked preferences
Keywords: social choice correspondence
Keywords: strategy-proofness
Keywords: voter
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:89