Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: RatulLahkar
Author-Name-First: Ratul
Author-Name-Last: Lahkar
Author-Email: ratul.lahkar@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ashoka UniversityAuthor-Name: 
Author-Name: Sayan Mukherjee
Author-Name-First: Sayan
Author-Name-Last: Mukherjee
Author-Email: sayanmukherjee012@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Author-Name: Souvik Roy
Author-Name-First: Souvik
Author-Name-Last: Roy
Author-Email: souvik.2004@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Title: Generalized Perturbed Best Response Dynamics with a Continuum of Strategies
Abstract: We consider a generalization of perturbed best response dynamics in population games with a continuum of strategies. The previous literature has considered the logit dynamic generated through the Shannon entropy as a deterministic perturbation. We consider a wider class of deterministic perturbations satisfying lower semicontinuity and strong convexity. Apart from the Shannon entropy, Tsallis entropy and Burg entropy are other perturbations that satisfy these conditions. We thereby generate the generalized perturbed best response dynamic with a continuum of strategies. We establish fundamental properties of the dynamic and show convergence in potential games and negative semidefinite games.
length: 42
Creation-Date: 20210203
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper51_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 51
Keywords: Logit Dynamic
Keywords: Negative Semidefinite Games
Keywords: Perturbed Best Response
Keywords: Potential Games
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:51