Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ratul Lahkar
Author-Name-First: Ratul
Author-Name-Last: Lahkar
Author-Email: ratul.lahkar@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ashoka University
Author-Name: Saptarshi Mukherjee
Author-Name-First: Saptarshi
Author-Name-Last: Mukherjee
Author-Email: saptarshi.isi@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: IIT, Delhi
Title: Dominant Strategy Implementation in a Large Population Public Goods Game
Abstract: We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Agents are divided into a finite set of types. The planner asks agents to report types, which generates a reported type distribution. Based on reported types and distribution, the planner calculates the efficient strategy level and a Pigouvian transfer for each type of agent. We show that this direct mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility in strictly dominant strategies, strong budget balance and ex–post individual rationality.
length: 09
Creation-Date: 20200901
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: Forthcoming, Economic Letters
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper36_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 36
Keywords: Externalities
Keywords: Pigouvian Pricing
Keywords: Public goods
Keywords: VCG Mechanism
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:36