Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Arkarup Basu  Mallik
Author-Name-First: Arkarup Basu 
Author-Name-Last: Mallik
Author-Email: arkarupbasumallik97@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: ISI Kolkata
Author-Name: Mihir  Bhattacharya
Author-Name-First: Mihir 
Author-Name-Last: Bhattacharya
Author-Email: mihir.bhattacharya@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Title: Consistency and social choice
Abstract: We consider a model of preference aggregation when a single public good has to be chosen. We do not impose any restrictions on the preferences. We show the impossibility of contraction consistent (CC), anonymous and Pareto efficient social choice functions. We provide a characterization of the priority based social choice function (Priority Rule) which satisfies a weaker version of consistency called Efficient Dominance (ED). ED is a Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) type of consistency criterion over the set of Pareto efficient alternatives. We show that the Priority Rule is the only social choice function that satisfies Pareto efficiency and Efficient Dominance.
length: 15
Creation-Date: 20250306
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper142_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 142
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:142