Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Swagata Bhattacharjee
Author-Name-First: Swagata
Author-Name-Last: Bhattacharjee
Author-Email: swagata.bhattacharjee@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Author-Name: Srijita Ghosh
Author-Name-First: Srijita
Author-Name-Last: Ghosh
Author-Email: srijita.ghosh@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Author-Name: Suraj Shekhar
Author-Name-First: Suraj
Author-Name-Last: Shekhar
Author-Email: suraj.shekhar@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Title: Communicating Bias
Abstract: We consider a static cheap talk model in an environment with either one or two experts whose biases are privately known by the experts themselves. Before the experts learn the state, they send a cheap talk message about their bias to the decision maker. Subsequently, the decision maker chooses one expert to get state relevant advice from. We ask two questions - One, is there an equilibrium where the experts’ bias is fully revealed? Two, is the bias revealing equilibrium welfare improving for the decision maker? We find that when there is only one expert, there is no bias revealing equilibrium. However, if there are two experts, there exists a bias revealing equilibrium, and under some conditions it gives the decision maker more utility than any equilibrium which is possible without bias revelation. This highlights a new channel
through which sender competition can benefit the decision maker, through which sender competition can benefit the decision maker.
length: 27
Creation-Date: 20240129
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper109_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 109
Keywords: bias revelation
Keywords: Cheap talk
Keywords: multiple senders
Keywords: uncertain bias
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:109