Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mihir Bhattacharya Author-Name-First: Mihir Author-Name-Last: Bhattacharya Author-Email: mihir.bhattacharya@ashoka.edu.in Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University Author-Name: Ojasvi Khare Author-Name-First: Ojasvi Author-Name-Last: Khare Author-Email: ojasvi19r@isid.ac.in Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute Title: Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains Abstract: We consider a social choice model where voters have single-peaked preferences over the alternatives that are aggregated to produce contiguous sets or intervals of fixed cardinality, L. This is applicable in situations where the alternatives can be arranged in a line (e.g. plots of land) and a contiguous subset of these is required (e.g. a hospital or a school). We define interval-social choice correspondences (I-SCCs) on profiles of single-peaked preferences which select intervals. We extend single-peaked preferences to intervals using responsiveness. We show that generalized median-interval (GMI) rules are the only strategy-proof, anonymous and interval efficient I-SCCs. These rules are interval versions of generalized median voter rules which consist of the median, min and max rules. We show that responsiveness over intervals is necessary for the strategy-proofness of the GMI rule if preferences over alternatives are single-peaked. length: 21 Creation-Date: 20230314 Revision-Date: 20230809 Publication-Status: File-URL:https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper89_0.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: 89 Keywords: median voter Keywords: responsive Keywords: single-peaked preferences Keywords: social choice correspondence Keywords: strategy-proofness Keywords: voter Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:89