Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Francis Bloch Author-Name-First: Francis Author-Name-Last: Bloch Author-Email: francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr Author-Workplace-Name:` Paris School of Economics Author-Name: Kalyan Chatterjee Author-Name-First: Kalyan Author-Name-Last: Chatterjee Author-Email: kchatterjee@psu.edu Author-Workplace-Name:` Pennsylvania State University Author-Name: Bhaskar Dutta Author-Name-First: Bhaskar Author-Name-Last: Dutta Author-Email: bhaskar.dutta@ashoka.edu.in Author-Workplace-Name:` Department of Economics, Ashoka University Title: Attack and Interception in Networks Abstract: This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. It involves a mixed strategy of the attacker except when one target has a very high value relative to others. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We also show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where nodes make sequential protection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object, and one where all nodes cooperate in defense. length: 47 Creation-Date: 20210402 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper57_0.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: 57 Keywords: Attack and defense Keywords: Inspection Keywords: Network interdiction Keywords: networks Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:57