Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: RatulLahkar Author-Name-First: Ratul Author-Name-Last: Lahkar Author-Email: ratul.lahkar@ashoka.edu.in Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ashoka UniversityAuthor-Name: Author-Name: Sayan Mukherjee Author-Name-First: Sayan Author-Name-Last: Mukherjee Author-Email: sayanmukherjee012@gmail.com Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata Author-Name: Souvik Roy Author-Name-First: Souvik Author-Name-Last: Roy Author-Email: souvik.2004@gmail.com Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata Title: Generalized Perturbed Best Response Dynamics with a Continuum of Strategies Abstract: We consider a generalization of perturbed best response dynamics in population games with a continuum of strategies. The previous literature has considered the logit dynamic generated through the Shannon entropy as a deterministic perturbation. We consider a wider class of deterministic perturbations satisfying lower semicontinuity and strong convexity. Apart from the Shannon entropy, Tsallis entropy and Burg entropy are other perturbations that satisfy these conditions. We thereby generate the generalized perturbed best response dynamic with a continuum of strategies. We establish fundamental properties of the dynamic and show convergence in potential games and negative semidefinite games. length: 42 Creation-Date: 20210203 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper51_0.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: 51 Keywords: Logit Dynamic Keywords: Negative Semidefinite Games Keywords: Perturbed Best Response Keywords: Potential Games Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:51