Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ratul Lahkar Author-Name-First: Ratul Author-Name-Last: Lahkar Author-Email: ratul.lahkar@ashoka.edu.in Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ashoka University Author-Name: Saptarshi Mukherjee Author-Name-First: Saptarshi Author-Name-Last: Mukherjee Author-Email: saptarshi.isi@gmail.com Author-Workplace-Name: IIT, Delhi Title: Dominant Strategy Implementation in a Large Population Public Goods Game Abstract: We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Agents are divided into a finite set of types. The planner asks agents to report types, which generates a reported type distribution. Based on reported types and distribution, the planner calculates the efficient strategy level and a Pigouvian transfer for each type of agent. We show that this direct mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility in strictly dominant strategies, strong budget balance and ex–post individual rationality. length: 09 Creation-Date: 20200901 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: Forthcoming, Economic Letters File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper36_0.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: 36 Keywords: Externalities Keywords: Pigouvian Pricing Keywords: Public goods Keywords: VCG Mechanism Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:36