Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Francis Bloch Author-Name-First: Francis Author-Name-Last: Bloch Author-Email: francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr Author-Workplace-Name: Universit´e Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics Author-Name: Bhaskar Dutta Author-Name-First: Bhaskar Author-Name-Last: Dutta Author-Email: b.dutta@warwick.ac.uk Author-Workplace-Name: University of Warwick and Department of Economics, Ashoka University Author-Name: Marcin Dziubi´nski Author-Name-First: Marcin Author-Name-Last: Dziubi´nski Author-Email: m.dziubinski@mimuw.edu.pl Author-Workplace-Name: Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw Title: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core. length: 28 Creation-Date: 20191002 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper21_0.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: 21 Keywords: Hide and Seek Keywords: networks Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:21