Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Francis Bloch
Author-Name-First: Francis
Author-Name-Last: Bloch
Author-Email: francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr
Author-Workplace-Name: Universit´e Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics
Author-Name: Bhaskar  Dutta
Author-Name-First: Bhaskar
Author-Name-Last: Dutta
Author-Email: b.dutta@warwick.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Warwick and Department of Economics, Ashoka University
Author-Name: Marcin Dziubi´nski
Author-Name-First: Marcin
Author-Name-Last: Dziubi´nski
Author-Email: m.dziubinski@mimuw.edu.pl
Author-Workplace-Name: Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw
Title: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks
Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.
length: 28
Creation-Date: 20191002
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper21_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 21
Keywords: Hide and Seek
Keywords: networks
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:21