Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Varun Bansal
Author-Name-First: Varun
Author-Name-Last: Bansal
Author-Email: varun23r@isid.ac.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute
Author-Name: Mihir Bhattacharya
Author-Name-First: Mihir
Author-Name-Last: Bhattacharya
Author-Email: mihir.bhattacharya@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Author-Name: Ojasvi Khare
Author-Name-First: Ojasvi
Author-Name-Last: Khare
Author-Email: ojasvi.khare@snu.edu.com
Author-Workplace-Name: Shiv Nadar University
Title: Stable Matchings with Choice Correspondences Under Acyclicity
Abstract: We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of Chambers and Yenmez (2017) by weakening the Path Independence assumption. For many-tomany markets, we show that stable matchings exist when choice correspondences satisfy Substitutability and a new General Acyclicity condition. We provide a constructive proof using a Grow or Discard Algorithm that iteratively expands or eliminates contracts until a strongly maximal Individually Rational set is reached. We provide an algorithm to obtain stable matchings in which rejected contracts are not permanently discarded, distinguishing our approach significantly from standard DAA-type algorithms. For one-to-one markets, we introduce a replacement-based notion of stability and provide an algorithm that constructs stable matchings when choice correspondences satisfy Binary Acyclicity, a property weaker than Path Independence.
length: 32
Creation-Date: 20260330
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:/www/wwwashokaeduin_628/public/dp/RePEc/ash/wpaper/paper160_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 160
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:160