Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Sanyyam Khurana
Author-Name-First: Sanyyam
Author-Name-Last: Khurana
Author-Email: sanyyam.khurana@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Title: Auctions with resale and correlated signals
Abstract: In this paper, we consider auctions with resale when bidders are symmetric and draw correlated signals. We show that the all-pay second-price auction with resale generates the highest expected revenue for the seller among the family of first-price auction, second price auction, all-pay first-price auction, all-pay second-price auction, first-price auction with resale, second-price auction with resale, first-price all-pay auction with resale, and second-price all-pay auction with resale.
length: 22
Creation-Date: 20250526
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:/www/wwwashokaeduin_628/public/dp/RePEc/ash/wpaper/paper148_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 148
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:148