Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Sanyyam Khurana
Author-Name-First: Sanyyam
Author-Name-Last: Khurana
Author-Email: sanyyam.khurana@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Ashoka University
Title: Symmetric auctions with resale
Abstract: In this paper, we consider resale in efficient auctions. The potential gains from trade arise from a delay in resale which reduces the bidders’ values. We consider two information states during resale: (a) complete information where all the bids are revealed and (b) incomplete information where no bids are revealed. Under complete information, we establish revenue equivalence between the first- and second-price auction for a family of trade rules where the market power is distributed between the reseller and buyer. We also show that, if all the market power lies with the reseller (resp., buyer), it is optimal (resp., not) to reveal information.
length: 32
Creation-Date: 20241014
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:/www/wwwashokaeduin_628/public/dp/RePEc/ash/wpaper/paper128_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 128
Keywords: efficiency
Keywords: information revelation
Keywords: private value
Keywords: resale
Keywords: symmetry
Keywords: time delay
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:128