Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Sabyasachi Das
Author-Name-First: Sabyasachi
Author-Name-Last: Das
Author-Email: sabyasachi.das@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ashoka University
Author-Name-First: Abhiroop
Author-Name-Last: Mukhopadhyay
Author-Email: abhiroop@isid.ac.in
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Author-Name: Rajas Saroy
Author-Name-First: Rajas
Author-Name-Last: Saroy
Author-Email: rajassaroy@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Title: Does Affirmative Action in Politics Hinder Performance? Evidence from India
Abstract: We examine how performance of elected representatives, as measured by delivery of public goods, is affected by affirmative action in elections, i.e., imposing quota in elections for one population group. We show both theoretically and empirically, using randomized electoral quotas for a caste group (OBCs) in India, that when group identities are salient and group sizes are asymmetric, affirmative action may in fact increase electoral competition and consequently, improve leader’s performance. The result challenges the notion that equity promotion must necessarily come at the cost of “efficiency.” It further justifies the electoral quota policy in India of targeting the jurisdictions where the group is numerous.
length: 63
Creation-Date: 20180802
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper03_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 03
Keywords: Electoral competition
Keywords: Gram Panchayat
Keywords: Public goods
Keywords: Reservation
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:03