Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Francis Bloch
Author-Name-First: Francis
Author-Name-Last: Bloch
Author-Email: francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr
Author-Workplace-Name:` Paris School of Economics
Author-Name: Kalyan Chatterjee
Author-Name-First: Kalyan
Author-Name-Last: Chatterjee
Author-Email: kchatterjee@psu.edu
Author-Workplace-Name:` Pennsylvania State University
Author-Name: Bhaskar Dutta
Author-Name-First: Bhaskar
Author-Name-Last: Dutta
Author-Email: bhaskar.dutta@ashoka.edu.in
Author-Workplace-Name:` Department of Economics, Ashoka University
Title: Attack and Interception in Networks
Abstract: This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. It involves a mixed strategy of the attacker except when one target has a very high value relative to others. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We also show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where nodes make sequential protection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object, and one where all nodes cooperate in defense.
length: 47
Creation-Date: 20210402
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper57_0.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
Number: 57
Keywords: Attack and defense
Keywords: Inspection
Keywords: Network interdiction
Keywords: networks
Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:57